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INTRODUCTION

Thermal-energy detection is one of the latest technological tools in
the government's arsenal used to identify and eliminate illegal indoor
cultivation of marijuana.1 Indoor cultivation has become prevalent
because law enforcement officials cannot detect the growing mari1. See Daniel J. Polatsek, Thermal Imaging and the Fourth Amendment: Pushing
the Katz Test Towards Terminal Velocity, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
453, 453 (1995).
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juana plants using traditional means of detection.2 Indoor cultivation
is also highly lucrative since as many as four crops can be harvested
annually 3 from a nominal investment in seeds, water, and artificial
lighting. The artificial lighting used in the cultivation process, however, generates thermal energy that either escapes or is vented to the
outside.4 Such thermal energy can be detected by a thermal energy
detection instrument, known as Forward Looking Infrared Radar
("FLIR"). 5 FLIR senses differences in surface temperatures and can
record its findings on videotape.6
Using FLIR generated visual images, law enforcement officials may
infer that an individual is cultivating marijuana plants indoors. These
inferences, when combined with other evidence, may then lead police
to discover illegal gardening operations.7 But, the warrantless use of
FLIR thermal imagery to locate indoor marijuana cultivation has been
challenged in the courts on Fourth Amendment' grounds.9 A threshold issue in these cases is whether scanning a person's residence with a
thermal imager constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 10
2. See Mindy G. Wilson, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This
Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth
Amendment Protections Against UnreasonableSearches?, 83 Ky. L.J. 891, 892 (1995).
3. See id.
4. See Bradley J. Plaschke, United States v. Deaner: Thermal Imagery, the Latest
Assault on the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 12 J. MARSHALL J COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 607, 608 n.5 (1994) (citing Telephone Interview with Col. Carlos Aniglioh,
President, Thermal Technologies, Inc. (Feb. 12, 1993)).
5. See Polatsek, supra note 1, at 453.
6. See id. at 453-54. See also United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1327 n.2
(11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1848 (1996). The Robinson court stated,
"FLIR thermal imaging is a process whereby differences in heat emissions are measured and reflected on a videotape. Heat concentration is indicated on a videotape on
a spectrum of light to dark, with bright white showing intense heat." Id.
7. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327 n.2.
8. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 11-13.
10. There is a "basic notion that in the hierarchy of Fourth Amendment values,
the privacy and sanctity of the home rank very high." JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES
AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 146 (1996 ed.) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has

stated, "At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which
the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized
by a warrant,and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize
as justifiable." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (emphasis added).
Moreover, an individual's heightened expectation of privacy extends to the curtilage
of his residence. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 292, 300 (1987). "At common
law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the
sanctity of a man's home and privacies of life. The protection afforded the curtilage is
essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to
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Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on this matter, the Fifth,"
Seventh,'. Eighth,13 and Eleventh Circuits have found the use of
FLIR does not violate 4the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches.'
However, the federal district courts, as well as state courts, are not
always reaching similar conclusions regarding the constitutionality of
FLIR imaging.' 5 Furthermore, a decision by the Tenth Circuit,
although subsequently vacated, found the use of FLIR a search and
hence, absent a warrant or probable cause, unconstitutional. 6 Nevera home, both physically and psychologicaly, where privacy expectations are most
heightened." California v. Circaolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986) (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court urged the use of four factors to determine whether an area was
within a home's curtilage: (1) the area's proximity to the home, (2) whether the area
was within an enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the nature and use of the area, and
(4) the visibility of the area to casual observers. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302. In Dunn,
police officers, without a search warrant, crossed several fences on the defendant's
property to get close enough to the defendant's barn to shine a light in its window and
observe what they determined was a drug laboratory. See id. at 297-98. The Court
held the area searched, which was approximately sixty yards from the defendant's
home, was not within the curtilage of the home and therefore the defendant could
have no reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. See
id. at 305.
11. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 74,
and cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 75 (1995). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
limited its holding to FLIR usage in an open field. See id. at 853. Open fields are
areas that police may search without a warrant. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984) (affirming a distinction between open fields and a home's curtilage for
Fourth Amendment purposes); United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding a barn fifty to sixty feet from a residence was in an open field rather than
within a residence's curtilage). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1091 (6th ed.
1990). In Ishmael, police officers used FLIR technology to Canvass the perimeter of a
steel building housing an illegal gardening operation located approximately two to
three hundred feet from the owner's secluded residence. See id. at 857. Ishmael contended, and the trial court held, that the government's intrusion, although not within
the curtilage of his residence, nevertheless violated his reasonable expectation of privacy "'that [his] effects, associated with the secreted metal building and the business
being conducted there, were safe from Governmental surveillance."' Id. at 852 (quoting United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 211 (E.D. Tex. 1994)). The circuit
court, however, reaffirmed its holding in United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.
1992) that "'there is no business curtilage surrounding a barn lying within an open
field,'" and thus, governmental officials were permitted to surveil Ishmael's steel
building because it stood in an open field like the barn in Pace. See Ishmael, 48 F.3d
at 856-57 (quoting Pace, 955 F.2d at 276). Furthermore, the Ishmael court held that a
FLIR instrument is non-intrusive and "does not intrude in any way into the privacy
and sanctity of a home." Id. at 857 (quoting United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 213 (1995)).
12. See United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 213
(1995).
13. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
14. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1848 (1996); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994); State v.
Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
16. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on
reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
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theless, in an en banc decision vacating the earlier ruling, the Tenth
Circuit avoided the issue of whether FLIR imaging constitutes a
search by finding that probable cause existed for the search of the
defendant's home.' 7 The second decision neatly avoided the constitutional issue, citing a policy of addressing constitutional questions only
when necessary for the resolution of the case. 8 The dissent, mostly
consisting of the members of the original panel, urged the court to
address the Fourth Amendment issue of whether FLIR imaging constitutes a search and reaffirmed its condemnation of the practice. 19
Hence, the issue of whether the use of FLIR violates the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches remains
unresolved.
Given the rapid development of technologies available to law enforcement organizations, it is vital that clear limits be set regarding the
scope of FLIR's permissible uses. Currently, many commentators are
debating
how Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relates to FLIR
20
use.

Part I of this Note examines the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizures, the Katz test used to determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the thing searched, and how advancing technology has blurred the division regarding whether and when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes. Part I also
reviews certain police surveillance technologies that courts have analogized to FLIR. Part II questions the adequacy of the Katz standard
for determining whether FLIR imaging constitutes a search, proposes
that comparing FLIR to other search devices and methods is inaccurate because FLIR is unique and unlike other modes and devices of
police surveillance, and discusses the consequences of law enforcement's unrestricted use of FLIR technology. Finally, this Note con17. See Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1250.
18. See id. (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 113

(1993)). In Zobrest, Justice Blackmun stated:

The obligation to avoid unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions
does not depend upon the parties' litigation strategy, but rather is a selfimposed limitation on the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction that has an
importance to the institution that transcends the significance of particular
controversies. It is a rule whose aim is to protect not parties but the law and
the adjudicatory process.
Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 113.
19. See Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1252-53 (McKay, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part and joined by Seymour, C.J., and Henry, J.).
20. Namely, the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) has been the
focal point of many commentators. See, e.g., Polatsek, supra note 1; Wilson, supra
note 2; Plaschke, supra note 4; Scott J. Smith, Note, Thermal Surveillance and the
ExtraordinaryDevice Exception: Redefining the Scope of the Katz Analysis, 30 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1071 (1996). James Francis Barna, Note Reforming the Katz Fourth
Amendment "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test: The Case of Infrared Surveillance of Homes, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 247 (1996).
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tends that courts should not allow law enforcement agencies to use
FLIR to search residences because it violates the Fourth Amendment.
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROVIDES PROTECTION FROM
UNREASONABLE

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF PERSONS,

HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS

The Fourth Amendment provides protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures of persons, houses, papers, and effects."' The
Fourth Amendment also provides that warrants shall not be issued
without probable cause.22 Initially, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted Fourth Amendment protection to require law enforcement officials to physically trespass on an individual's property before

the Court would find a constitutional violation.23 However, by the
late 1960s, technology gave law enforcement the ability to access an
individual's private information without the need to physically trespass. 4 Since that time, courts have been asked to determine how and
when law enforcement's use of such technologies intrudes upon an
individual's Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
A.

The Katz Test: Determining What Is a Search Based on a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard

In interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme
Court in Katz v. United States2 5 held that warrantless searches are per

se unreasonable.2 6 However, the Katz Court also explained, "What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office is
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. See id.
23. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at
352.
24. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); United States v. Katz,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. See id. However, there are several categories of warrantless searches that
courts hold do not violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable
searches. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (upholding
warrantless search based on voluntary and intelligent consent); Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (upholding warrantless search
where delay would endanger lives of police or others); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153-57 (1925) (upholding warrantless search of vehicles illegally transporting
contraband upon a showing of probable cause). In addition, Katz established that a
successful Fourth Amendment attack on a warrantless search must involve a defendant's showing of both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy in the area
searched. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). First, the defendant
must exhibit an actual expectation of privacy to satisfy the subjective component, and
second, the privacy expectation must be one that society recognizes as reasonable,
which, if proved, satisfies the objective component. See id. at 361.
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not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."27 In so holding, the
Court articulated a two-prong test to determine whether a search occurred by ascertaining whether an individual has a constitutionally
protected expectation of privacy in items or places belonging to or
possessed by the individual.2 8
The first prong of the Katz test asks whether the defendant possessed a subjective expectation of privacy.29 The Katz Court explained that an item might be constitutionally protected if an
individual seeks to preserve it as private and has a subjective expectation of privacy "even in an area accessible to the public."3 The subjective expectation of privacy can generally be proved through
evidence that the defendant took actions to preserve as private the
object of the search.3

The second prong of the Katz test asks whether society would deem
the individual's expectation reasonable.32 Thus, the pertinent question is "whether the police surveillance 33'violated the privacy upon
which [the defendant] justifiably relied.' ,,

While courts have followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Katz, technology has advanced and the degree of invasive procedures

used by police in surveillance has likewise advanced. Thus, it has become more difficult for courts to determine if and when the police,
using these new technologies, violate an individual's Fourth Amend-

ment rights against unreasonable searches. This is most certainly the
case with FLIR imaging, which is a highly invasive and advanced tech27. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733
(1877) (citations omitted).
28. See Katz, 389 U.S at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. See id. 389 U.S. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966);
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
30. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854 & n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 74, and cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995) (citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
450 (1989)).
31. Evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy can be shown in a number of
ways. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1503 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on
reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (by blocked windows); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (tall fences); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448
(1989) (enclosures such as a greenhouse). Additionally, a dweller need not take every
precaution against detection in order to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy.
See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74,
and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995). The second Katz question, what privacy expectation society is willing to accept as reasonable, is not as easily answered as the subjective prong. See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 449-52; Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 212-13; Ishmael, 48
F.3d at 855-56.
32. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. See also Dow v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 251
(1986) (Powell, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). ("Katz measures Fourth Amendment rights by reference to the
privacy interests that a free society recognizes as reasonable not by reference to the
method of surveillance used in the particular case.").
33. Riley, 488 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353) (alteration in original).
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nological tool. Currently, FLIR can distinguish variations in heat as
minute as 0.5 degrees Fahrenheit.34 Hence, FLIR offers a new level of
intrusiveness that goes well beyond that of traditional surveillance
methods. Nevertheless, thermal imagery is currently being used by
police departments to obtain information about individuals' activities
inside residences and in the absence of a warrant. While it is understandable that courts have yet to come to a consensus, based on the
Katz test, regarding whether and when the use of FLIR constitutes a
search, some definite limits must be established to protect individuals'
Fourth Amendment rights.
B.

Cases Upholding Warrantless Searches by Finding No
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Law enforcement agencies use a wide range of technologies and
methodologies in their surveillance activities, including narcotics
dogs,35 aerial observation, 36 pen registers, 37 sound amplifiers, 38 radio
scanners, 39 X-ray scans, magnetometers,4 ° electronic beepers, 4' as well
as FLIR technology. 4 The following survey of caselaw analyzing surveillance devices may prove helpful in understanding how other devices and technologies differ from FLIR. Courts supporting the use of
FLIR technology have justified its use by analogizing FLIR to less
intrusive surveillance methods, such as electronic beeper monitoring,
34. See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 213 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48
F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75
(1995). See also Michael A. DeVito & Stuart M. Flamen, Note, "FLIR"ting With
Danger: A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Infrared Imaging, 110 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT

651, 672 n.46 (1995).

35. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
37. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). In Smith, the Court recognized that a pen register is a record of telephone calls made from a specific telephone
but held that the petitioner had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers he dialed, thus law enforcement's recordation of the numbers dialed did not
constitute a search. See id. at 744-45. The Court commented that the telephone company maintains records of numbers called and the petitioner assumed the risk that the
company would forward that information to the police. See id. Thus, the Court reasoned the use of automated records is the modern day counterpart to the operator
who used to personally connect and complete calls, and since there was no expectation of privacy in numbers called then, there should be none today. See id.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
39. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 438 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Wis. 1989) (holding that there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the use of a cordless phone because an
FCC warning to that effect was in the owners manual).
40. See Plaschke, supra note 4, at 617 ("The use of sophisticated ... devices such
as magnetometers and X-ray scans have been uniformly held to constitute a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
41. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1984).
42. See infra Part I.B.4.
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narcotics dogs, and aerial observations. When considered in depth,
however, these analogies fail.
1. Electronic Beeper
An electronic beeper is a device that emits a radio frequency signal
that can be detected by an appropriate radio receiver. By monitoring
the strength and direction of the signal from the beeper, the operator
can deduce information regarding the device's location relative to the
detector. Police have used this technology to trace the movements of
automobiles and containers of chemicals used in the manufacture of

illegal drugs.43 In United States v. Knotts," the police, using a beeper,

were able to monitor a container's location as it was transported. The
Supreme Court held that warrantless placement of a beeper in a
container to ascertain the container's ultimate location by monitoring
the beeper's signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy of the container's possessor and therefore was not a search under
the Fourth Amendment. 45 The Court reasoned that the beeper revealed no more information than could have been discerned with the
naked eye, because monitoring the beeper amounted to simply following a car on a public roadway.4 6 Further, the Court noted that a person traveling in a car on public roads has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements.47 Moreover, the Court concluded that in
monitoring the beeper to follow the container's movements, the police
used the beeper to merely enhance their natural sensory faculties and
such enhancement is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.48
2. Canine Sniff
While dogs are not considered technology in the same sense as electronic devices, use of their olfactory sensitivity is an amplification of
the human olfactory sense and has been used to extend law enforcement's ability to detect odors that would require closer proximity or
greater concentrations for a person to detect. Police use of canines
was sanctioned in United States v. Place,49 where the Court found the

43. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276 (1984).
44. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). In Knotts, a company selling chloroform to the defendant

consented to the installation of a beeper inside a five-gallon container subsequently
sold to the defendant. See id. at 278. The police monitored the beeper and followed
the car carrying the container, "maintaining contact by using both visual surveillance
and a monitor which received the signals sent from. the beeper." Id. Ultimately, the
police followed the vehicle to a secluded cabin, which the police kept under surveillance for three days while they secured a search warrant. See id. at 279. The subsequent search revealed a "fully operable, clandestine drug laboratory in the cabin." Id.
45. See id. at 285.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 281.
48. See id. at 282.
49. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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use of a police dog to sniff luggage was not a search and thereby not
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.5" In Place, law enforcement
agents working at an airport, "seized" luggage from a passenger so
that it might be exposed to a specially trained drug-sniffing dog.5 The
Court found the use of police dogs was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 52 Lower courts, following this rationale, have upheld the use of narcotics dogs to detect odors emanating
54
53
from semi-trailers parked in a public lot and mobile homes.
3.
a.

Visible Light Observations
Naked Eye Observations

The plain view doctrine 55 has been combined with various forms of
technology to broaden law enforcement's ability to gather information. For instance, in Californiav. Ciraolo,56 the Supreme Court expanded application of the plain view doctrine to aerial naked-eye
observation. In Ciraolo,police flew over the defendant's home at one
thousand feet and observed marijuana plants growing in a back yard
shielded from view from ground level by a six-foot fence.57 The Court
acknowledged that the occupant had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his back yard by erecting the fence.5 8
However, the Court found that this expectation, was not one that society would deem reasonable because the curtilage59 of a home is not
protected from inspection involving no physical invasion.6" Further,
reasoning that private and commercial flights are now commonplace,
the Court determined that naked eye observations, by police, from
legal platforms, do not constitute searches and thus do not require a
warrant. 6 1 The Court stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement
officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public
thoroughfares."62
50. See id. at 707.
51. See id. at 699.
52. See id. at 707.
53. See United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
54. See id.
55. Under the plain view doctrine, "if police are lawfully in a position from which
they view an object, and its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if
the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a
warrant." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality
opinion)).
56. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
57. See id. at 209.
58. See id. at 211.
59. See supra note 10.
60. See id. at 213-14.
61. See id. at 215.
62. Id. at 213.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

9

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 5

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

The Court followed the same logic in Florida v. Riley.6 3 From a
helicopter four hundred feet overhead, police observed marijuana
plants growing in the respondent's greenhouse through missing roof
panels.64 The Court held this was not a search in violation of the

Fourth Amendment, because the respondent could not reasonably expect the contents of his greenhouse to be immune from aerial observa-

tion when the roof of his greenhouse was left partially open.65 The
Court reasoned that helicopters at that altitude are not uncommon

and the aircraft did not interfere with the use of the home or curtilage.66 The Court further determined that in observing greenhouse
contents through a hole in the roof from a helicopter at four hundred
feet, police did no more than what any citizen could have legally

done. 67 According to the Court, areas within the curtilage of the
home that could be observed from a legally positioned aircraft are not
constitutionally protected.6 8

b. Aerial Photography at Visible Wavelengths
On the same day it issued the Ciraolo decision, the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Dow v. United States.69 Dow involved a
government agency inspecting a chemical plant using high-resolution
visible light aerial photography. Because the area photographed was
within an "industrial curtilage," the Court denied Dow's assertion that
it had an expectation of privacy.70 In distinguishing this case from surveillance of residences, the Court stated the government has greater
latitude in conducting warrantless inspections of commercial property
because of a lowered expectation of privacy.71 Significantly, however,
in rendering its decision regarding standard visible light aerial photography surveillance, the Court hinted at how it might rule in a case
63. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
64. See id. at 448.
65. See id. at 450.
66. See id. at 451-52.
67. See id. at 451.
68. Interestingly, some courts have ruled that using binoculars and telescopes during surveillance of residences is not allowed without a warrant. See, e.g., United
States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976) (stating "[agents] have no right to
peer into people's windows with special equipment not generally in use").
69. 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (explaining that the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") sanctioned a flight to take aerial photographs of the Dow facility to assess
compliance, whereby Dow asserted the photography constituted an unlawful warrantless search because Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy within its industrial
curtilage).
70. The court found no analogy between the open areas of the complex and the
curtilage of a home; rather, the Court found the open areas of the plant were more
comparable to an open field. Id. at 239. Thus, photographing an industrial plant from
navigable airspace is not a prohibited search. Id. The Court conceded, however, that
Dow did have an expectation of privacy within its covered buildings that society
would deem reasonable. Id. at 236.
71. See id. at 237-38 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981)).
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involving other types of technology, perhaps FLIR. The Court opined
that warrantless surveillance of private property with high technology
equipment might violate the Fourth Amendment.7 2
4.

FLIR

As previously stated, thermal imagery is a highly advanced technology. Thermal imagery measures reflected or emitted infrared light in
much the same manner that a camera captures visible light.7 3 The device is passive and emits no beam or rays.74 The resulting image is
displayed in shades of gray with white representing the hottest objects
in the field of view, and the cooler objects appearing darker.7 5 The
device is capable of detecting minute variations in heat allowing police
to detect most activities occurring within. 76 Nevertheless, some courts
are holding that FLIR imaging does not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.7 7
The reasoning in United States v. Penny-Feeney78 is the basis for
most court decisions that support warrantless FLIR investigations.7 9
In Penny-Feeney, a Hawaiian vice officer obtained a warrant to search
the home, based on information that included a FLIR videotape of
the defendants' home. s° In its analysis, the Penny-Feeney court analogized FLIR to several constitutionally sanctioned types of surveillance
devices and techniques.8 1
First, the district court analyzed the FLIR instrument to other "extra-sensory, non-intrusive equipment," such as beepers and dogs used
by police to investigate people and objects, that the Supreme Court
has held do not constitute an impermissible Fourth Amendment
search.82 Second, the court examined the nature of the heat moni72. The court stated,
It may well be . . . that surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated equipment not generally available to the public . . . might be

constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant .... The mere fact that human
vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here [more detailed than
naked eye observations, but limited to building and equipment outlines],
An electronic device to
does not give rise to constitutional problems ....
penetrate walls or windows ... would raise very different and far more serious questions ....
Id. at 238-39 (footnote omitted).
73. See Polatsek, supra note 1, at 453.
74. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
75. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1995).
76. See supra note 34.
77. See supra notes 11-14.
78. 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd sub nom. on other grounds, United
States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
79. See Polatsek, supra note 1, at 459.
80. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 224.
81. See id. at 226-28.
82. Id. at 226 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (placing a beeper
in a container to track movements of a vehicle held not a search); United States v.
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tored by FLIR and found the heat to be "an incidental byproduct of
various energy sources used to help cultivate marijuana" that the defendants did not "assert dominion over. '8 3 Furthermore, based on the
defendants' actions to eliminate the heat from the premises, the court
classified the heat as "heat waste" or "abandoned heat."84 Because

the defendants sought to vent the heat, the court found the defendants
did not manifest either a subjective or an objective expectation of privacy as required by the Supreme Court in Katz.85 The Penny-Feeney
court reasoned that there was no subjective expectation of privacy in
the heat waste because the defendants purposefully vented the heat
outside the garage, thereby exposing it to the public.86 Moreover,
analogizing the vented heat to garbage in plastic bags placed outside a
home, the court, following California v. Greenwood,87 suggested that
society would not accept a privacy expectation in the heat waste as
objectively reasonable.

Reiterating the non-intrusive nature of FLIR imaging, the court
analogized its use to that of "specially trained marijuana sniffing
dogs,"89 which the court in United States v. Solis9" held to be reasonable and therefore not prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. 91
Moreover, the court said that Penny-Feeney should have expected the
heat to emanate from the garage and thus could not expect it to be
Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (using a dog to sniff luggage at an airport held not a
search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (establishing that a "pen register"
with the phone company is not a search)).
83. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 225.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 228. See also supra Part I.A. (discussing the Katz two-prong test).
Evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy can be shown in a number of ways.
See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1503 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on reh'g
en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (blocked windows); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (tall fences); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989) (enclosures such as a greenhouse). Additionally, a dweller need not take every precaution
against detection in order to exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy. See United
States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 74, and cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995). The second prong of the Katz test, what privacy expectation society is willing to accept as reasonable, is not as easily answered as the subjective prong. See, e.g., Riley, 488 U.S. at 449-52; Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 212-13; Ishmael, 48
F.3d at 855-56.
86. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226. "[T]he heat waste vented outside of the
Penny-Feeney home may be analogized to the garbage placed outside of the respondent's home in [California v. Greenwood] ...... Id. In Greenwood, the Supreme
Court reasoned "that society is not prepared to accept as objectively reasonable an
expectation of privacy in plastic garbage bags left outside the home." California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1987).
87. 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1987).
88. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226; see also supra Part I.A.
89. Id. at 226-27.
90. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that utilizing dogs to detect contraband is
inoffensive and similar to other police use of dogs, like search and rescue missions and
guard duty, and thus was not an unreasonable use).
91. See id. at 882.
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private, just as the defendant in Solis should have expected marijuana
odor to emanate from his trailer.9" Furthermore, the court noted that
both emanations "constitute a physical fact indicative of possible
crime [and are] not protected communications" that give rise to
Fourth Amendment considerations.93
In United States v. Ford,94 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed for the first time whether use of FLIR to investigate a mobile home was a search subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.95
In Ford, Florida law enforcement officers, late at night, covertly entered Ford's leased'property where he kept a mobile home. 96 The officers hid in thick foliage to surveil the mobile home using a thermal
imager." Although Ford had boarded the mobile home's windows,
locked the property gate, and situated the mobile home a quarter of a
mile from the gate to prevent outsiders from observing his illegal marijuana operation, the court called attention to holes in the mobile
home's floor through which excess heat was vented to justify its holding that Ford had no subjective expectation of privacy triggering
Fourth Amendment protection.98 The court also justified its holding
by asserting that FLIR imaging is non-intrusive, stating, "the thermal
imagery ... appears to be of such low resolution as to render it inca-

pable of revealing the intimacy of detail and activity protected by the
' In particular, the court held that the informaFourth Amendment."99
tion obtained by a FLIR imager was not personal or sensitive and did
not reveal any specific activities inside Ford's mobile home. 100 For
these reasons, and using Greenwood's curbside garbage analogy, a"1
the court determined that Ford did not have an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the heat vented outdoors.' 02 Thus, the court
found that Ford failed the subjective and objective prongs of the Katz
test by actively venting the heat.'013
The following year, in United States v. Robinson,'°4 the Eleventh
Circuit revisited the issue and again found warrantless FLIR surveillance constitutionally permissible. 105 In Robinson, an Alabama narcotics agent directed a helicopter crew to conduct a thermal
92. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227.
93. Id.

94. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
95. See id. at 993.
96. See id.
97. See id.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id.
Id. at 996.
See id. at 997.
See supra text accompanying note 85.
See Ford, 34 F.3d at 997.
See id. at 995-96.
62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1848 (1996).

105. See id.
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examination of Robinson's home and to compare
the emanating heat
10 6
with that of surrounding homes and objects.
The Robinson court first addressed whether the two-prong Katz test
was met by asking: (1) whether Robinson had a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat generated by his indoor marijuana cultivation and (2) if so, whether the expectation was one society would
accept as objectively reasonable.1" 7 The court determined that
although "Robinson attempted to conceal his marijuana growing operation by conducting it inside his home, the record [did] not indicate
that he affirmatively took any action to prevent the resulting heat
from being emitted into the atmosphere above his house."'10 8 Consequently, the court interpreted this lack of action to conceal emitted
heat as an abdication of any subjective expectation of privacy. 10 9 Furthermore, the court determined that the objective prong of the Katz
test could not be met because the thermal imaging examination revealed no intimate details connected with Robinson's home. 110 The
court said, "[T]he FLIR surveillance revealed only that Robinson's
house emitted significantly more heat than others in the neighborhood
of similar size. No revelation of intimate, even definitive, detail within
the house was detectable; there was merely a gross, nondescript bright
image indicating the heat emitted from the residence.""' Thus, the
court held that because of this lack of intrusion, society would not
accept the use of the Fourth Amendment to shield illegal activity in
the home 2when non-invasive surveillance methods are used for
detection."
Finally, the Robinson court analogized the use of a thermal imager
to the now common warrantless utilization of dogs to locate contraband." 3 In particular, the court quoted an Eighth Circuit opinion
finding that heat emanating from indoor growing operations and detected by FLIR is similar to odors that can be detected by trained
dogs. 114 The court held that both FLIR and the canine-sniff are passive and non-intrusive means of police surveillance that do not
threaten the "intimacy, personal autonomy and privacy associated
with a home.""' 5 In sum, the court held that the "FLIR surveillance
106. See id. at 1327.
107. See id. at 1328-29.
108. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328-29.
109. See id. at 1329.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1329-30.
112. See id. at 1330.
113. See id.
114. See id. (citing United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994)).
See also United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 213
(1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994).
115. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss2/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I2.4

14

Kwasowski: Thermal Imaging Technology: Should Its Warrantless Use By Police

FLIR AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

1997]

not an unreasonable search violative of the
of Robinson's home was
1' 16
Fourth Amendment."
In United States v. Pinson,117 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
likewise analogized FLIR imaging to a canine-sniff and then bolstered
its approval of law enforcement's use of FLIR technology by comparing Pinson's abandoned heat or heat waste to "bagged garbage left for
collection outside a private residence."' 8 The Pinson court, following
Greenwood, determined that Pinson had no legitimate expectation of
privacy "in the inculpatory items that [he] discarded," for example,
the heat vented from his house. 19 The court held detection of the
abandoned heat was not intrusive because FLIR images reveal no intimate details of the home, and thus, "there was no intrusion upon the
privacy of the individuals within."' 2 °
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit joined the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits, holding that thermal image scanning is not a search
within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Myers,121 the court concentrated on the emanated heat as the object of
the investigation.' 22 The court found that Myers made no attempt to
conceal the emitted heat and, like the Robinson court, held that this
inaction equated to Myers lacking a subjective expectation of privacy.
The court, however, failed to address any attempts Myers made at
concealing the illegal operation itself in determining whether the subjective prong of the Katz test was satisfied.12 3
II.

WARRANTLESS

FLIR

IMAGING OF RESIDENCES SHOULD

BE PROHIBITED

A.

The Katz Test May Be Inadequate To Determine When the Use
of New Technologies Constitutes a Search

In light of rapid technological developments, the adequacy of the
Katz test in protecting Fourth Amendment rights has been questioned, 124 and for good reason. As discussed previously, 1 25 in determining what constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes,
under the first prong of Katz, the defendant must establish that he had
a subjective expectation of privacy in the thing searched. The subjective expectation of privacy can generally be established through evidence that the defendant took actions to preserve as private the object
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1058 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)).
Id. (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41).
Id. at 1059.
46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 213 (1995).
See id. at 669.

123. See id.

124. See generally Polatsek, supra note 1, at 453.
125. See supra Part I.A.
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of the search.12 6 Key in the analysis is identification of the object of
the search.
When a thermal imager scans a residence, the object of the scan is
the residence; the scanner happens to use emitted heat radiation as its
source of information. When police use FLIR to scan a residence, the
government's interest is not in the heat itself, but rather, in the specific activities taking place within the residence. Hence, the argument
that "waste heat" is the object of the search is illogical because any
observation could be deemed to not be a search by simply asserting
that the object of the search was the visible light photons escaping,
cast off, or "abandoned" by a particular subject. 27
Courts addressing FLIR's constitutionality have failed to account
for the fact that heat naturally dissipates and society in general may be
unaware of the government's ability to monitor escaping heat. Hence,
it remains unclear how a person could evidence a privacy interest in
heat. Since FUR measures heat variations, a relatively hotter home
will always signal authorities that activities inside are generating heat.
This is irrespective of a homeowner's attempt to conceal that fact.
Thus, the government could always contend that an individual fails
the first prong of the Katz test, regardless of whether the heat is forcibly vented or naturally dissipates from the home.
The second prong of the Katz test asks whether society would deem
the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy reasonable. 2 8 The
Court has reiterated this tenet, stating, "Katz measures Fourth
Amendment rights by reference to the privacy interests that a free
society recognizes as reasonable .... "129 The pertinent question then
becomes whether police surveillance "violated the privacy upon which
[defendant] justifiably relied."1' 3
Pursuant to Katz, whether society accepts an expectation of privacy
as reasonable is key. Reasonableness must take into account the nature of what is being monitored and the degree to which a law enforcement officer can make inferences about the contents and
activities of the object. Herein lies the problem. First, it is difficult to
ascertain whether the defendant has, or whether society will recognize
as reasonable, an expectation of privacy in a thing previously not
monitored, such as heat emissions, for the sole reason that no technol126. See supra note 84.
127. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on
reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996). The court, in attacking the Greenwood
garbage analogy stated, "we have never heard the process of sight described in terms
of abandoned photons." Id.
128. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
129. Dow v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 251 (1986) (Powell, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
130. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456 (1989) (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)) (alteration in
original).
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ogy was available or capable of performing such monitoring in the
past. Indeed, it could be easily argued that because such a thing could
not previously be monitored, that a person would naturally and reasonably have an expectation of privacy in the thing. Not surprisingly,
in most FLIR cases, homeowners have either taken no steps to evidence a privacy interest in the escaping heat or have taken affirmative
steps to ventilate the heat.
In sum, it currently appears that an individual has no expectation of
privacy for the simple reason of advancements in technology.
Although courts must recognize the continual advancement of technology, this advancement may erode our right to privacy. However,
an individual's "legal right to privacy should reflect thoughtful and
purposeful choices rather than simply mirror the current state of the
commercial technology industry." 1 3 ' Technological advancement is an
inappropriate basis for denying an individual Fourth Amendment protection. It does not follow that private activities are without protecare capable of viewing these activities from
tion, simply because police
132
a non-intrusive distance.
In order for the Katz test to remain viable, the courts must determine the point where technological advances violate the Fourth
Amendment. Without a clear standard, police "could not be certain
as to when a warrant is needed. 1 3 3 The line should be drawn at what
human senses can detect. A human detection limit will allow the Katz
test to continue to be effective in preserving Fourth Amendment
rights. If it is not an enhancement of a naturally occurring human
sense, the warrantless use of technology for surveillance should be
prohibited. This rule, combined with the special protection afforded
the home and curtilage, will serve to preserve Fourth Amendment
rights in the face of advancing technology. Thus, if the "natural
human sense" limit is incorporated the Katz test can remain viable in
determining the reasonableness of searches.
FLIR Is DistinguishableFrom Other Types of High-Tech Police
Surveillance Devices and Methods
Thermal imaging is a unique technology, and analogies to naked
eye observations, aerial photography, canine sniff, and garbage are invalid. The distinguishing feature of FLIR is the nature of the "energy" or "light" it detects. Infrared light occupies a portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum than the unaided human eye cannot detect.
Thus, infrared light remains undetected by traditional means of sensory enhancement such as simple magnification or signal
amplification."3
B.

131.
132.
133.
134.

Young, 867 P.2d at 598.
See id. at 600.
Id. at 598.
See Plaschke, supra note 4, at 620.
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Thermal imagery measures reflected or emitted infrared light. 135
The resulting images are displayed in shades of gray, with white repre1 36
senting the hottest objects and the cooler objects appearing darker.
Most importantly, thermal imagers are capable of distinguishing variations as minute as 0.5 degrees Fahrenheit.' 37 Thus, the imager displays

relative temperatures as opposed to an object's actual temperature. 138
FLIRs are generally operated at night to avoid solar energy interference. Additionally,
the FLIR operator must establish a control group
1 39

for reference.
In Dow v. United States, 4 ' the Supreme Court stated that "surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public ... might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."'' Thermal imagers are highly
sophisticated and are commercially available at a range of prices, 42
but the cost would effectively place them out of the general public's
reach. The Court's apprehensive statement in Dow applies to FLIR
technology, and
its warrantless use is therefore constitutionally
43
questionable.

The Dow Court stated that "for the use of sophisticated surveillance
1' 44
equipment to be constitutional, it must not reveal intimate details.'
However, thermal imagers can reveal activities taking place within a
residence from both inferences and direct observation. With only a
general floor plan and a thermal imager, an operator could identify
activities in a typical home such as use of a shower or bathtub, operation of various appliances, or movement of human bodies. 4 5 Thermal
imagers can detect human forms near open windows and behind plywood walls.1 46 Thus, the line between mundane and intimate activity
135. See Polatsek, supra note 1, at 453.
136. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 851-52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 74, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995).
137. See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 213 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48
F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995).
138. See Young, 867 P.2d at 595.
139. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1522-23. A control group is necessary for comparison since buildings that are venting abnormal amounts of heat will appear markedly
different than surrounding structures. In the case of residences, neighboring homes
are generally used for comparison purposes. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773
F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), affd sub nom. on other grounds, United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
141. Id. at 238.
142. Models of varying degrees of sophistication are available with prices ranging
from $15,000 to $225,000. See Plaschke, supra note 4, at 608 n.4.
143. See Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
144. Id.; see also Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 855 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating "[t]he crucial inquiry, as in any search and seizure analysis, is whether the technology reveals 'intimate details'") (citing Dow, 476 U.S. at 238).
145. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497,1505 n.14 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
146. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994).
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could be easily crossed. For instance, the court in United States v.
Cusumano stated, "It would take no great wit to speculate as to the
1' 4 7
origin of two mild hot spots, commingled, in a bedroom at night.'
Law enforcement's continued use of FLIR could require courts to determine what is intimate or simply mundane. More .appropriately,
courts should balance the interests of an individual in protecting his
private activities in his home against the State's interest in using FLIR
to detect illegal drug operations. Hence, FLIR's capabilities threaten
an individual's constitutional guarantee against "unreasonable"
searches and any counter-balancing governmental justification should
clearly outweigh that protection.
1. FLIR Is Distinguishable From the Beeper
In United States v. Karo,1 48 the Supreme Court reiterated that police
beeper-monitoring did not constitute a search if the container holding
the beeper was in a vehicle on public roads. 1 49 However, the Court
noted that when a container holding the beeper entered a private residence, police could track its movement and receive information about
the home's interior that they otherwise could not have obtained by
visual observation or without a warrant. 150 Thus, the Court found that
monitoring the beeper within a residence would require a warrant. 15 1
Absent a warrant, the Court held such a search was unconstitutional.
The Court further stated the same result would follow where the government employs an electronic device to obtain information that it
could not have
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of
1 52
the house.

In State v. Young, 53 the Washington Supreme Court, analyzing the
Supreme Court's holdings in Karo and Knotts, determined that FLIR
imaging was "at least as intrusive as the beeper in Karo.' 54 In a like
manner, the Young court, drawing on the analogies of other courts,
deduced that FLIR technology reveals "information that [police]
could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of
147. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1504 n.11.
148. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
149.
150.
151.
152.

See
See
See
See

id. at 721.
id. at 715.
id.
id.

153. 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994). The Washington Supreme Court recognized
that since FLIR utilization violated the Washington Constitution's heightened constitutional protection of an individual's home, the court did not need to answer whether
FLIR surveillance of the defendant's home violated the Fourth Amendment. See id.
at 601. However, to provide guidance to "other courts on the subject of sense-enhanced surveillance of a home," the court argued against each of the Penny-Feeney
court's contentions and analogies and determined that the "infrared surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment." Id.
154. Id. at 602.
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the house."' 55 Therefore, FLIR's ability to gather information is at
least as intrusive as the beeper.
In contrast, the Penny-Feeney court, citing Knotts, stated, "Time and
again, the United States Supreme Court has held that police utilization of extra-sensory, non-intrusive equipment ... does not constitute

a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."' 56 Inexplicably,
however, the court made no mention of Karo, although the PennyFeeney home was the object of a FLIR investigation.
In contrasting Karo and Knotts, it is readily apparent how "the
Supreme Court has differentiated between the use of sensory enhancement devises in homes from their use on other objects."'1 57 In
Karo, the Supreme Court emphasized how inviolate an individual's
home should be when determining whether a certain type of investigatory activity should be allowed without a warrant. 158 Additionally, the
Court's statements in Karo "contain[ ] the Supreme Court's most recent statement on the use of a sensory enhancement surveillance device on a private residence.' 1 59 As the Young decision noted, the
Supreme Court has determined that the use of surveillance devices,
such as a beeper, to gather specific information about the home's interior-information that could not be obtained by naked visual observation-is prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. 160 Just as the
proscribed beeper, FLIR technology reveals "information that [police] could not have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house,' 16 ' and is likewise constitutionally prohibited.
Analogous to electronic beepers that emit radio frequencies, heat
or infrared radiation is not within the natural range of human visual
sensitivity. Simple magnification is not sufficient to render it visible.
Visualization of infrared radiation requires technology that extends
the natural range of human vision to wavelengths beyond normal
human perception.
In terms of human perception, infrared radiation is similar to radio
waves and at the other end of the electromagnetic spectrum, X-rays
and gamma rays. However, radio waves are intentionally emitted
from devices such as microphones, beepers, and cordless telephones in
specific patterns for communication purposes. For instance, a cordless
phone emits radio waves only when operating. 162 Radio waves are
155. Id.
156. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991) (citing
U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1982); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), affd
sub nom. on other grounds, United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
157. Young, 867 P.2d at 601.
158. See id.

159. Id.
160. See id. (citing Karo, 468 U.S. at 714).
161. Id. at 602.
162. Cf. State v. Smith, 438 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1989).
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emitted in a pattern that can be decoded by anyone with an appropriate receiving device. Because they are purposefully emitted, radio
waves are distinguishable from infrared radiation or heat. In contrast
to radio waves, heat is the natural by-product of energy conversion
processes, such as that which occurs in the operation of home appliances and the human metabolism.
Dissipation of heat is a natural process. Like a drop of dye placed
in a glass of water, heat would eventually disperse into the environment whether forcibly vented from a building or not. So, unlike electronic devices intentionally emitting radio frequencies, heat emission
from a home does not necessarily manifest intent to discard or abandon the heat or otherwise place it in the public domain. Some radiation, such as X-rays, and gamma rays are emitted as part of the natural
process of radioactive decay of certain materials. Detecting this type
of radiation requires a special device such as a Geiger counter. The
government could conceivably detect radioactive material within a
residence using such a device, not unlike using a thermal imager to
detect heat. However, because of the danger posed to humans, the
government tightly regulates radioactive materials. Thus, the public
fosters little expectation of privacy in possessing these types of materials in the home. Heat, on the other hand, does not pose such danger,
and is not regulated. While there is similarity in the dissipation of
heat and other naturally occurring emissions, an individual is likely to
possess, and society should recognize as reasonable, an expectation of
privacy in an activity generating heat. For these reasons, thermal imagery is not analogous to any other technology or methods used in
government surveillance activities.
2.

FLIR Is Distinguishable From the Canine Sniff

In contrast to thermal imaging, devices such as telescopes and binoculars enhance visible light observations by magnification. These devices merely modify an existing natural human sense. The net effect
of such magnification is to enlarge and increase the resolution of an
image. Using cameras can improve resolution in a temporal sense as
well, producing the effect of slowing down or speeding up real time. It
is not an illogical stretch to view the canine-sniff as this type of magnification. Because dogs have eight times the sensitivity of the human
nose, 163 using dogs merely allows humans to detect something they
could naturally detect if the substance were present in higher concentration or closer in proximity.
Comparing FLIR to trained police dogs is initially found in PennyFeeney. 1" Beginning the comparison, the court sets out the facts in
163. See United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976).
164. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991), affd
sub nom. on other grounds, United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
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United States v. Solis.'65 In Solis, agents investigating a trailer home
found indications that contraband might be stored inside.' 6 6 Without
first obtaining a search warrant, agents used specially trained marijuana sniffing dogs to investigate the trailer. 167 Based on the dogs'
positive reactions to the trailer, the agents obtained a search warrant,
and discovered large quantities of marijuana.168 The Ninth Circuit refused to suppress the marijuana evidence and found the use of the
dogs was non-invasive of the home's curtilage and "reasonably tolerable in our society.' 1 69 The court bolstered its decision by finding that
the defendant also lacked a subjective expectation of privacy as
demonstrated by his intent to mask the odor. 170 By attempting to
mask the odor, the court found that the defendant implicitly acknowledged a belief that the odor would emanate from the trailer and thus
would no longer be private. 1 71 The fact that authorities used an investigative method keyed to the escaping odors did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
In its analogy between FLIR and police dogs, the Penny-Feeney
court focused on the non-intrusive nature of the canine-sniff and reasoned the use of FLIR is equally non-intrusive. 172 The court stated
that using FLIR was not a search of a person, nor did it entail any
embarrassment to the defendant; therefore, it was not prohibited. 7 3
Also critical to the court's comparison was the defendant's subjective
expectation of exposure of incriminating evidence. The court found
the defendant knowingly exposed the heat by installing exhaust fans
to ventilate excessive heat.' 74 Like the defendant in Solis, this knowledge of exposure defeated any argument that Penny-Feeney retained
an expectation of privacy in the heat. A similar analysis is embraced
in United States v. Pinson,'175 and is adopted by a majority of courts
sustaining warrantless FLIR usage.
These decisions, however, fail to sufficiently distinguish FLIR from
the use of police dogs. Similar to FLIR,a dog senses emanations from
the interior of an object and conclusions can then be drawn regarding
the object's contents. A critical distinction, however, is the extent of
165. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
166. The officers found talcum powder around the seals of the door, and based on
their experience that talcum powder is often used to conceal the odor of narcotics,
proceeded with their investigation. See id. at 881.
167. See id.
168. See id. According to agents, the dogs reacted as far as twenty-five feet from
the trailer; however, the dogs were used as close as one foot from the home. See id.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 882.
See id. at 882-83. See also supra note 166.
See id.
See Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227.

See id. The court found that any intrusiveness was so minimal as not to be

reasonably protected by society.

174. See id.
175. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
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information that each device can detect. The dog senses odor, the
FLIR heat. A specially trained police dog, while detecting most
odors, will only react to a narrow range of smells associated with illegal narcotics. The dog provides very limited information about the
contents of a dwelling or a piece of luggage and for this reason the
Supreme Court regards the canine-sniff as sui generis 7 6 This is not
true of FLIR. The FLIR detects all heat emanating from the home,
and based upon minute variations in that heat the instrument can
pinpoint areas of concentration. Using a basic floor plan of the home,
agents can then draw inferences about the location and source of heat
emissions. The problem is that FLIR reacts equally to illegal mari1 77
juana cultivation or an unexpected electrical device in a closet.
FLIR is indiscriminate in its detection of heat, and any unexpected
anomaly can result in officers unjustifiably searching a home.
The decisions analogizing FLIR to the dog sniff fail to account for
several important distinctions. For instance, in Solis, after the court
espoused that modern technology and its possible development led to
a more protective test than a simple test of physical trespass, 7 8 stated,
"No sophisticated mechanical or electronic devices were used. The
investigation was not indiscriminate, but solely directed to the particular contraband., 179 This is completely nonanalgous to FLIR,where a
sophisticated device is employed and is not directed to a particular
contraband, but rather detects any and all escaping heat. Thus,
Penny-Feeney's reliance on Solis is misplaced. The Solis court clearly
recognized that pervasive indiscriminate technology was not similar to
a canine-sniff and was violative of the Fourth Amendment. 8 ° FLIR
and its indiscriminate, though arguably minimally-intrusive nature,
fails under a complete analysis of Solis.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Place equally dispels the comparison. The Court stated that the canine-sniff
does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view, as does, for example an officer's rummaging through the contents of ...luggage ..... Moreover, the sniff
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
item. Thus despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities someis
thing about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained
18
limited .... In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. 1
176. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
177. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1519 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (finding
that the FLIR surveillance had detected a dehumidifier in the closet of a private residence from the heat it emitted).
178. See Solis, 536 F.2d at 882. The court reiterated the potential dangers of technology that led to the adoption of the Katz test of reasonableness, rather than the
physical trespass requirement of Olmstead v. United States. See id.

179. Id.
180. See id.

181. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
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Again, FLIR imaging is not limited to the detection of contraband
items. While heat is not classified as contraband, courts have attempted to distinguish contraband heat from non-contraband heat.
Even accepting this designation, FLIR imaging exposes all heat,
whether labeled contraband or not. Therefore, unlike the canine sniff,
the FLIR is intrusive and should be proscribed by the Fourth
Amendment.
3. FLIR Is Distinguishable From Plain View Visible
Light Observations
Are heat emissions in "plain view," such that they do not rise to the
level of a search? The Tenth Circuit's logic in Cusumano, holding that
heat emissions are not in "plain view," is persuasive. For an object 18to2
be in "plain view," it must be knowingly exposed to the public.
Emitted heat can be visualized only with a thermal imager. To date,
the general household does not have a thermal imager. Further, it is
doubtful that the general public is aware that law enforcement has the
capability of conducting a FLIR search, and even this knowledge does
not mean that there is no constitutional protection. While this equipment is commercially available, its cost precludes general availability
to the public. Thus, a dweller would not expect the public to see or
even be able to detect heat emitted from activities within his home.
To consider emitted heat as "exposed" to the public is an unreasonable stretch of logic.
It would be more accurate to consider the dweller as having exposed emitted heat to the police rather than to the public. Even if the
public were well familiar with the capabilities of FLIR imaging, the
requirement of "exposure" to the public would not be met. If this
were not the case, then the reasonableness of a search would depend
on how effectively the government conveyed to the public the capabilities of the technology used. The privacy of the home could hinge on a
technological race of measure/counter-measure between the citizens
and the government; a race the people would likely lose.18 3 General
acceptance by the public of high-tech police methods should not lead
to abatement of Fourth Amendment rights' 84 and the public's increased awareness of technology should not cause a diminishment of
the rights of citizens. 185 The Tenth Circuit was therefore correct in
excluding heat emissions from the Plain View doctrine.

182. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
183. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on
reh'g en banc 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
184. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994).
185. See id. at 597.
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C.

The Consequence of Unrestricted Use of FLIR:
Unchecked Police Discretion

Absent a clear limit, advancing technology will create additional
complications. For instance, the current application of FLIR to identify specific activities within a residence requires an experienced technician.186 However, it's only logical to assume that continuing
evolution of sensing and imaging technology will lead to better image
processing and enhanced image resolution. Computers may be used
to combine images with other information to create more inferences
or create enhanced images of the interior of a home based on those
inferences. 187 The net result will be an increase in the amount of information that can be gathered from a thermal scan.
If thermal imagery is not considered intrusive at present, it is likely
that at some point it will. Determining precisely where this point is
located will be difficult. Technology evolves continuously. In contrast, predicting when a case or controversy will arise such that the
warrantless use of FLIR may be challenged is not predictable. Therefore, a real danger exists that the government's technological capability will outpace case law regarding the intrusiveness of thermal
imagery. The public will be left with outdated and obsolete standards
to protect them from unreasonable intrusions into the privacy of their
homes.1 88 Law enforcement may be left without guidelines to determine at what point "intrusiveness" begins. So the line of thinkingthat thermal imagery is currently non-intrusive and therefore does not
constitute an unlawful search-ignores important legal questions that
must be resolved.
Furthermore, there are dangers inherent in allowing the government unrestricted, warrantless use of thermal imagery. Heat emissions from a residence generally occur without the conscious
knowledge of the dweller. Moreover, the public is generally unaware
of the capabilities of thermal imaging technology. 89 Thus, in general,
186. See United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (describing typical operator duties and functions).
187. The Cusumano court expressed concern about the invasiveness of thermal
imaging of private residences, stating,
It seems quite possible that given only a general knowledge of a home's
floor plan, a thermal imager could be used to identify a host of activities of
virtually every home in this country .... These are mundane activities, to be
sure, but activities nonetheless conducted in the domestic enclave. The routine [activity] is no more the government's legitimate business than is the
intimate.... [The Fourth Amendment] does not afford greater protection to
the study than to the kitchen ....

Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1505 n.14 (citation omitted).
188. "[A]s technology races ahead ... our subjective expectations of privacy may
be unconsciously altered. Our right to privacy may be eroded without our awareness,
much less our consent." Young, 867 P.2d at 598.
189. "We rather doubt that society is aware that heat signatures can be read with
any greater accuracy than tea leaves." Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1505.
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residents have no basis to expect that police could or would scan their
home with FLIR seeking to ascertain what activities are occurring
within the home. Commonly, thermal imaging devices have been focused on residences in the
vicinity of the subject of the surveillance for
"comparison purposes."19 Indeed, police may only determine that
the residence under surveillance is emitting excessive heat by comparing that residence with those of the subject's neighbors, who are not
the focus of the surveillance. Should neighboring homeowners be suspected of growing marijuana if the "comparison" scan reveals "suspicious" heat emissions emanating from their homes? Similar heat
emissions would be obtained from a residence growing African Violets. 191 Thus, because police look for differences in heat patterns that
distinguish the target from whatever may be typical of other residences in the area, FLIR's operation gives law enforcement unfettered discretion and even requires police to scan private residences
without citizen's knowledge or consent and without probable cause or
even a reasonable
suspicion that illegal activity may be transpiring
192
inside.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the dangers inherent with
unchecked police discretion. In Katz, the majority found that the police possessed enough information to obtain a warrant.1 93 Despite this
fact, the police conducted a search without first acquiring one. In
spite of the narrowly intrusive manner of the search and the restraint
exercised by police; the Court refused to sanction the self-imposed restraint. Instead, the Court reaffirmed earlier decisions mandating that
police restraint without adherence to the proper judicial process is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 94 The Court found that
allowing the police such a high degree of discretion was constitutionally offensive. 195
Moreover, as technology continues to advance, the threat that the
use of FLIR will diminish an individual's Fourth Amendment protection will grow. For example, combining thermal imagery with satellite
technology will permit police to scan entire neighborhoods, without a
warrant.1 96 The potential for abuse is significant, especially without
precise guidelines. The public needs protection against the potential
erosion of Fourth Amendment rights by the government's un190. See Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1523 (explaining that two other houses were randomly scanned to create a control group); see also United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773
F. Supp. 220, 224 (D. Haw. 1991), affd sub nom. on other grounds, United States v.
Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); Young, 867 P.2d at 595.
191. See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 214 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48
F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74, and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995).
192. See Young, 867 P.2d at 600.
193. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
194. See id. at 356-57.
195. See id. at 366. See also Young, 867 P.2d at 600.
196. See Polatsek, supra note 1, at 477.
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restricted use of high technology surveillance. Thus, absent clearly delineated limits defining exactly when the use of FLIR becomes

intrusive and constitutes an unreasonable search, government officials
should be required to obtain a warrant before using FLIR.
Currently, the majority of courts have asserted that FLIR is nonintrusive and placed it in the same class with beepers,' 97 pen registers,198 and narcotics dogs-techniques used in other approved warrantless searches. 199 Furthermore, courts have opined the limited

imaging resolution of FLIR means it cannot reveal the kinds of intimate details and activities expected by society to be protected by the

Fourth Amendment. °° Thus, the crucial analysis is whether the technology in question reveals any intimate details about the activity inside
an individual's home.2 01 Because FLIR imaging does not involve any
physical intrusion into an individual's home, some courts hold that
"[n]one of the interests which form the basis for the need for protection of a residence, namely the intimacy, personal autonomy, and pri22
vacy associated with the home, are threatened by thermal imagery., 1
Thus, based on the premise that FLIR is not physically intrusive, the
majority of courts have found that society-will not recognize as reasonable any subjective expectation of privacy in heat emitted from a
residence. 0 3 However, as previously illustrated, such analysis is
flawed since FLIR surveillance is unlike other methods of police surveillance, because (1) the lack of physical intrusiveness, standing
alone, does not determine whether a surveillance technique is intrusive; (2) FLIR is unlike other surveillance methods; and (3) FLIR can
intrude upon an individual's intimacy, personal autonomy, and privacy

in the home.
CONCLUSION

The Fourth Amendment protects the public from unreasonable
searches.2 04 Evolving technology has called into question the meaning
197. A beeper is a portable radio transmitter planted on the person or property, by
police, to trace movement. The beeper emits radio signals that can be picked up by
police with the proper equipment. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
198. A pen register is a device that can be used to detect and make a record of
telephone calls made from a specific phone, thus allowing police to know what phone
calls are being made from a particular phone. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
736 (1979).
199. See United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991), affd sub nom. on other grounds,
United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
200. See Ford, 34 F.3d at 996-97 (stating "[s]uch information is neither sensitive nor
personal, nor does it reveal the specific activities within the mobile home").
201. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
74, and cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 75 (1995).
202. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1994).
203. See supra Part I.B.4.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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of reasonable and what society will accept as reasonable within the
confines of the Fourth Amendment. The increasing level of sophistication of police surveillance equipment allows greater levels of intrusion to be made into a residence. This increasing sophistication of
technology highlights the need for an objective standard for establishing what society will accept as reasonable. Indisputably, the Katz test
remains viable in determining whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an object searched. However, the Katz test
appears inadequate to address some technological advances. Thus,
law enforcement officers need clear limits such as the natural human
sense restriction. This restriction test recognizes that society will only
accept as reasonable any surveillance technology that extends natural
human senses. Drawing the line at what is capable of being naturally
sensed by humans is an appropriate objective standard for what society considers reasonable. Such an objective standard will provide law
enforcement with adequate guidelines for searches and maintain the
expectation of privacy citizens enjoy in their homes. Unfortunately,
the use of thermal imagery, which extends far beyond the scope of
traditional law enforcement technology, interferes with the reasonable
expectation of society, and therefore its warrantless use should be proscribed. Because thermal imagery is not a simple enhancement of a
natural human sense, the courts should not allow warrantless use of
thermal imaging devices in law enforcement surveillance.
Mark J. Kwasowski
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